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Abstract
The New-Keynesian Taylor-Rule model of ination determination with no role for
money is incomplete. As Cochrane (2007a, b) argues, it has no credible mechanism
for ruling out bubbles (or deal with the non-uniqueness problem that arises
when the Taylor principle is violated) and as a result fails to provide a reason for
private agents to pick a unique stable path. We propose a way forward. Our proposal
is in e¤ect that the New-Keynesian model should be formulated with a money demand
and money supply function. It should also embody a terminal condition for money
supply behaviour. If indeterminacy of stable (or unstable paths) occurred the
central bank would switch to a money supply rule explicitly designed to stop it via the
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terminal condition. This would be therefore a threat/trigger strategycomplementing
the Taylor Rule  only to be invoked if ination misbehaved. Thus we answer the
criticisms levelled at the Taylor Rule that it has no credible mechanism for dealing
with these issues. However it does imply that money cannot be avoided in the new
Keynesian set-up, contrary to Woodford (2008).
JEL classications: E31, E52, E58
Keywords: New-Keynesian; Taylor rule; Determinacy; terminal condition; money
supply
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1 Introduction
The New-Keynesian Taylor-Rule (NK, henceforth) approach to monetary economics provides
the current standard model of ination determination. By linking interest rate decisions
directly to ination and economic activity, Taylor Rules o¤ered a convenient tool for studying
monetary policy while abstracting from a detailed analysis of the demand and supply of
money.1 This change in the standard analytics is an understandable reection of how most
central banks now make monetary policy: by setting a short-term nominal interest rate, with
little if any explicit role for money (see Friedman, 2003).2 Furthermore, econometric evidence
supporting the stabilization properties of this rule (see Taylor, 1999) and its usefulness for
understanding historical monetary policy (see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 2000) explains its
popularity.3
While the NK approach has been remarkably successful, there are reasons to be uneasy
about the lack of modelling of money markets. For example, Cochrane (2007a) argues that
the way standard New Keynesianmodels work to discipline ination is in fact incredible:
In e¤ect, the Fed threatens to raise ination and interest rates without limit should ination
deviate from the stable path. That is, the Fed threatens hyperination or deation, unless
1Woodford (2008) describes a class of New-Keynesian models and draws attention to the fact that interest
rates transmit directly to intertemporal spending decisions and that monetary policy need not be framed in
terms of monetary aggregates. For an account of the origins of the Taylor Rule in early work by Henderson
and McKibbin (1993), see Minford (2008).
2There are exceptions of course. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to assign a
prominent role to money in its monetary policy strategy. In what the ECB calls its two-pillar strategy,one
pillar is economic analysis,which assesses the short-to-medium-term determinants of price developments.
In addition, a second pillar, monetary analysis, assesses the medium- to long-term outlook for ination,
exploiting the long-run link between money and prices.
3These developments have greatly inuenced monetary policy research and teaching. This allowed the
development of simpler models (see the survey in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999) and the replacement of
the LM curvewith a Taylor Rule in textbook treatments of the Hicksian IS-LM apparatus (see Taylor
(2000) and Romer (2000)).
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ination jumps to one particular value on each date. This is true: if ination takes o¤ along
a bubble path in this model what is there to stop it? The NK answer seems to be: just the
horrifying thought that this might happen! Essentially, the government threatens to blow
up the (monetary) worldto use Cochranes phrase should any but one equilibrium occur.
Because people believe this threat, ination goes to this unique path. But would people
really avoid deviant paths fearing this nuclear option? And would they believe that the Fed
would stick with such a rule under such circumstances?
One problem is that these threats are not credible. The reason is that, once ination
or deation happens, carrying through on the threat is a disastrous policy. As a result
self-destructive threats are less likely to be carried out ex-post, and thus less likely to be
believed ex-ante. A second problem with these threats is that even if they were credible and
did actually happen, there seems to be nothing to stop people following the implied paths.
While undesirable from a social viewpoint, they do not appear to be impossible. Thus no
transversality conditions on real variables appear to be violated for reasonable versions of
NK models.
Another reason to be uneasy with this model is that its account of the high
ination episode of the 1970s is vacuous.The main claim of the NK Taylor rule
view of ination determination is that ination got out of control in the 1970s
because the Fed reacted insu¢ ciently to ination (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler,
2000). Yet, as Cochrane (2007a, b) and Minford (2008) have argued, if the Fed
in the 1970s had such a Taylor rule in place, then ination would have been
indeterminate. So, in what sense does this account for any ination path at all?
What this shows is that the Taylor Rule is an incomplete description of monetary policy,
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at least within a NK model; it cannot account for determinate ination before 1980, and
after 1980 it lacks a clear mechanism for ruling out unstable paths. One has to assume that
the authorities have some additional tool in their locker to deal with these issues.
Our proposal is in e¤ect that the NK model should be formulated with a money demand
and money supply function. It should also embody a terminal condition for money supply
behaviour. If indeterminacy occurred the central bank would switch to a money supply
rule explicitly designed to stop it via say a terminal condition. This would be therefore a
threat or trigger strategy complementing the Taylor Rule  only to be invoked if ination
misbehaved. Of course if the strategy is credible it would never be observed and you would
just get the Taylor Rule. Thus we achieve a determinate solution without appealing to the
notion that the unstable paths are ruled out by an extreme threat to wreck the monetary
economy4; and also answer the criticisms levelled at the Taylor Rule that it has no credible
mechanism for dealing with bubbles or the non-uniqueness problem  we do this
via our threat strategy.5 However it does imply that money cannot be avoided in the NK
set-up, contrary for example to Woodford (2008). There has to be a money supply rule
operating in emergency at least. Thus in summary we reinterpret the nature of monetary
policy under Taylor Rules used in NK models. Monetary policy is in e¤ect not fully revealed
by simply writing down a Taylor Rule; behind itlies various implied commitments  viz to
the provision of money according to a long-term (terminal) condition that limits undesirable
4Cochrane (2007b) argues this can be a non-Ricardian scal policy. This is a possible route but here we
maintain the usual NK assumptions: that the Taylor Principle applies and that scal policy is Ricardian.
Our objective is to show that the NK model can work in its own terms, by adding a background condition
relating to money supply policy.
5We agree that the NK set-upis modied, as it must be given its awed nature on which there is wide
agreement; but our point is that the modication allows the model to work exactly as intended and hence
removes this aw. We would maintain that these supplements are not damaging to the NK approach in
practical macro modelling terms, though they do prevent any claim to there being a cashless world.
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behaviour of ination with an override of the money supply rule implicit in the Taylor Rule.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we construct a frictionless NK model,
and uncover the general properties of this model. We also study determinacy in the standard
three-equation NK model. We verify that the issues are the same, and the Fed after 1980
does in fact determine ination by threatening hyperination, not by stabilizing past ina-
tion. In contrast, ination is indeterminate before the 1980s in this model. Section
3 explains how we deal with both explosive solution paths and the non-uniqueness prob-
lem in traditional macro models of the 1970s. Section 4 explain how we deal with these
issues in a frictionless NK model.We also answer the criticisms levelled at the Taylor Rule
that it has no credible mechanism for ruling out bubbles or dealing with the problem of
indeterminacy  we do this via a terminal condition for money supply behaviour. Section
5 provides concluding remarks.
2 Determinacy in New-Keynesian model
2.1 Determinacy in a frictionless New-Keynesian Model
The basic points do not require the Phillips - IS curve features of NK models, and thus
they do not need any frictions. This might come as a surprise to those of us who have
been brought up to think that in the Keynesian framework the Phillips curve pins down the
ination rate given output supply, which is demand determined. But in the NK literature
it is routine to discuss ination determination without mentioning the Phillips curve (see
Woodford 2008 for example). Following Cochrane (2007a) we start with a very simple model
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consisting only of a Fisher equation and a Taylor Rule describing monetary policy:6
it = r + Ett+1 (1.1)
it = r + 
? +  (t   ?) (1.2)
where it =nominal interest rate, t =ination and r =constant real rate. The coe¢ cient
 > 0 measures how sensitive the central banks interest rate target is to ination. We can
solve this model by substituting out the nominal interest rate, leaving only ination,
Ett+1 =  (t   ?) + ?,
or
Ett+i+1 =  (Ett+i   ?) + ?, (for i  0) (1.3)
where we have a rst order expectational di¤erence equation in t. The general solution
for this rst order di¤erence equation can be expressed as
Ett+i+1 = 
? + (t   ?) ()i , (for i  0) . (1.4)
Equation (1.4) has many solutions, and this observation forms the classic doctrine that
ination is indeterminate with an interest rate target. However, if  > 1 (Taylor Principle),
all of these solutions except one eventually explode. This example makes it crystal-clear that
6Cochrane (2007a) takes the standard three-equation NK model and simplies it by assuming full price
exibility so that output equals the natural rate in each period. This eliminates the Calvo Phillips curve
and the output gap term in the standard Taylor rule. He also assumes that the natural rate of output is a
constant which yields the relation (1.1), where r is a constant real rate of interest.
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ination determination comes from a threat to increase future ination if current ination
gets too high. If ination takes o¤ along a bubble path what is there to stop it in this model?
The NK answer is: just the dreadful thought that this might happen. This is because in this
model the monetary authority is absolutely committed to raising interest rates more than
one for one with ination, for all values of ination. For only one value of ination today
will we fail to see ination that either explodes or, more generally, eventually leaves a local
region. Ruling out non-local equilibria, NK modellers conclude that ination today jumps
to the unique value that leads to a locally-bounded equilibrium path.
In contrast, if  < 1 (the Taylor Principle is violated), one could choose any
value for t di¤erent from ?, and the solution to (1.4) describes a path that
eventually takes the system back to steady state (i.e., t  ! ?, as i  ! 1).
Because there is an uncountable number of such paths, each of which follows
a path back to steady state, it follows that there is a multiplicity of stable
equilibria- the non-uniqueness problem. In principle any of these stable paths
could be selected. Thus, as Cochrane (2009b) argues, the NK Taylor rule model
has absolutely nothing to say about ination in the 1970s, other than ination
is indeterminate, so any value can happen.
2.2 Determinacy in the three-equation model
Now let us consider a standard NK model with frictions (for example, see Clarida et al.,
(1999) and Woodford (2003)). For determinacy questions, we can work with a stripped-
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down model without constants or shocks.
yt = Etyt+1   rt,  > 0 (2.1)
it = rt + Ett+1, (2.2)
t = Ett+1 + yt, ,  > 0 (2.3)
where where yt = output and rt = real interest rate. This representation can represent
deviations from a specic equilibrium of a model with shocks (see Cochrane (2007b). The
rst two equations derive from consumer rst order conditions for consumption today vs.
consumption tomorrow.7 The rst equation is a log-linear approximation to an Euler equa-
tion for the timing of aggregate expenditure, sometimes called an intertemporal IS relation.
This is the one that indicates how monetary policy a¤ects aggregate expenditure: the ex-
pected short-term real rate of return determines the incentive for intertemporal substitution
between expenditure in periods t and t +1. The last equation is the NK Phillips curve. It
is derived from the rst order conditions of intertemporally-optimizing rms that set prices
subject to costs.8 The remaining equation required to close the system is a specication
of monetary policy. We might, for example, specify policy by a rule of the kind proposed
by Taylor (1993) for the central banks operating target for the short-term nominal interest
7See Woodford (2003, chaps. 35) for discussion of the microeconomic foundations underlying equations
(2.1) and (2.2). Woodford (2008) refers to models of this kind neo-Wicksellian,to draw attention to the
fundamental role in such models of a transmission mechanism in which interest rates a¤ect intertemporal
spending decisions, so that monetary policy need not be specied in terms of an implied path for the money
supply, but the terminology NewKeynesianfor such models has become commonplace, following Clarida
et al. (1999), among others.
8This equation represents a log-linear approximation to the dynamics of aggregate ination in a model
of staggered price-setting of the kind rst proposed by Calvo (1983).
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rate,
it = t,  > 0. (2.4)
2.3 Can Such a Model Explain the Rate of Ination?
A rst question about this model is whether such a model which has thus far made no
reference to the economys supply of money has any implication for the rate of ination.
Woodford (2008) argues that while a model like this does not determine the ination rate
independently of monetary policy, it does determine the ination rate without any reference
to money growth and without any need to specify additional relations beyond those listed
above. He goes on to argue that there is nothing conceptually incoherentabout a model of
ination determination that involves no role whatsoever for measures of the money supply.
Using (2.4) to substitute for it in (2.2), the model (2.1)(2.3) can be written in the form,
2664 Etyt+1
Ett+1
3775 = 1
2664  +    (1  )
  1
3775
2664 yt
t
3775 .
The eigenvalues of matrix A that is, 1 and 2, are computed by setting det (A  I) = 0.
This gives a second-order polynomial in :
1


2   (1 +  + )+  (1 + ) = 0
where 1 + 2 = (1 +  + ) and 12 =  (1 + ).
Proposition 1 If the number of eigenvalues of A outside the unit circle is equal to the
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number of non-predetermined variables (or forward-looking variables), then there exists a
unique stable solution. Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
Proposition 2 Let 1, 2 lie in the complex plane, then: the is (i = 1, 2) are both outside
the unit circle if and only if the following conditions are satised:
j1 + 2j < j1 + 12j
j12j > 1.
For the usual parameter values in NK models ( = 1,  > 0,  > 0 and  > 1) the system
guarantees both eigenvalues are greater than one. Thus the general solution for Ett+1 can
be expressed as
Ett+i+1 = 
? + A1 (1)
i + A2 (2)
i , (for i  0) . (2.5)
How does the Fed plan to stabilise ination in this model? In this model, Etyt+i and
Ett+i explode in any equilibrium other than y = 0,  = 0. According to NK modellers,
 > 1 (the Taylor Principle), would stabilize ination. But how does it rule out the unstable
path? Here NK authors become vague, saying that such paths would be inconceivableand
hence ruled out by private agents.
Thus for example King (2000, p. 5859, cited in Cochrane, 2007a) writes: By specifying
[  > 1] then, the monetary authority would be saying, if ination deviates from the neutral
level, then the nominal interest rate will be increased relative to the level which it would be
at under a neutral monetary policy. If this statement is believed, then it may be enough
to convince the private sector that the ination and output will actually take on its neutral
level.
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Ruling out such non-local equilibria, the NK tradition concludes that output and ina-
tion are again determinate. According to Cochrane (2007a), in e¤ect if current ination
misbehaves the Fed threatens to implement such paths (hyperination or hyperdeation).
Thus the threat is to blow up the world and this threat is supposed to be so terrifying
that private agents expect the stable path instead. No economic consideration rules out
the explosive solutions. With  > 1, the explosive solutions are legitimate solutions of the
model, just as the multiple solutions are legitimate with  < 1.9
This interpretation of the ruling-out of unstable paths raises many questions. Consider
what is being said. 1) if ination rises (falls), it will be forced into a hyperination (hyper-
deation) by the Fed. 2) if ination remains on target, then the Fed will maintain it at that
target. So we need to establish how this enables private agents to choose the stable path.
Clearly they will prefer the stable path; but how can they be sure it will happen, given that
all the paths are feasible. The rst question is: is the threat in statement 1) credible? People
know that hyperination (hyperdeation) is costly for the central bank/government too. If
we think of ination as a tax chosen by the government on optimising grounds then plainly
the government will be thrown away from its optimum, obtaining excessive (inadequate)
revenue etc. Thus if the central bank carries out this threat, the governments and societys
9
Proposition 3 If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less than the number of non-
predetermined variables, there is an innity of stable solutions. Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
Proposition 4 Let 1, 2 lie in the complex plane, then: the is (i = 1, 2) are one inside and one outside
the unit circle if and only if the following condition is satised:
j1 + 2j > j1 + 12j.
For the usual parameter values in NK models and  < 1 this condition is met. That is, there are innity
of stable paths  the non-uniquenessproblem (Taylor, 1977).
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interests would be badly damaged. So people would conclude that the central bank would
simply not follow up on its threat in societys best interests. That is, they would expect the
central bank to accommodate rising ination ( < 1). So clearly the implicit threat in NK
models (the Taylor Principle) is simply not credible in equilibrium.
The second question is: assume the threat is credible; then if it were to be carried out
is there anything to stop the unstable path continuing to innity? One possible way that
the path could be stopped is by violating real variable transversality conditions. In the NK
model this is not the case, as noted by Cochrane. In models with a demand for real balances,
McCallum (2009a) notes that transversality conditions on real money demand cannot rule
out hyperinations for reasonable preferences. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1983) reached the same
conclusion when money enters the utility function, suggesting that the government could
rule out hyperination by backing the currency at some fractional value. This is a policy
suggestion, which acts in a similar way to our suggestion below, as we will explain.
Thus we nd that a) the rule implies an incredible threat; and that b) even were it
to be credible, it would imply that unstable paths would continue to innity were they
to occur. Under a) the Taylor Rule defaults to an accommodative rule under which there
is indeterminacy of stable paths. Under b) unstable paths would carry on for ever were
they to occur. Hence there is nothing to make them infeasible. Thus e¤ectively we have two
possible NK models; either one with indeterminacy of stable paths or one with indeterminacy
of unstable paths. Notice we are not attacking the NK model as such but we are arguing
that it fails to provide a reason for private agents to pick a unique stable path.10
10McCallum (2009a,b) further proposes to rule out unstable paths in the NK model by a learnability
condition. That this condition does rule them out is disputed by Cochrane (2009). We also note that there
may be situations where agents already know, or learn in some direct way, the models that exist. In such
13
3 Traditional Macro Model and Ination Determinacy
How do we deal with these issues in traditional macro models of the 1970s? Our objective
here is twofold. We show that the solution of this model is similar to the NK model discussed
above. Moreover, we shall show how we deal with indeterminacy in these models.
We illustrate this with the aid of the Minford and Peel (2002) version of Cagans (1956)
hyperination model, described by the equation system (3.1)(3.2).
mt = pt    (Etpt+1   pt) ,  > 0 (3.1)
mt = m, (3.2)
where mt and pt are the natural logarithms of money supply and the price level, re-
spectively; and m is a monetary target, and E is the rational expectations operator. The
rst equation is a money demand function, specifying that the demand for money responds
negatively to expected price level changes. The second equation is a money supply function
where the government has a monetary target, m. The above model is an example of RE
models involving a future variable, and the main problem in solving the model comes from
the presence of Etpt+1 in the rst equation.
situations learnability (or at least least squares learnability) does not arise and the criterion cannot therefore
work. Our proposal here is o¤ered as an alternative criterion that is bound to work in all models of this
type.
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Substituting ([?]) in (3.1) for mt yields;
Etpt+1 =

1 + 


pt   m

(3.3)
or
Etpt+i+1 =

1 + 


Etpt+i   m

(for i  0) . (3.4)
The solution of this rst-order non-homogenous di¤erence equation is:
Etpt+i+1 = p
? + A ()i , (for i  0)
Etpt+i+1 = m+ (pt  m)

1 + 

i
, (for i  0) . (3.5)
where m is the equilibrium of pt (the particular solution), 1+ is the unstable root and
pt  m is the constant (determined by the initial value pt) in the generalsolution. Notice
that the general solution for Etpt+i+1 has the same form as (1.4) above. Equation (3.5) gives
an innite number of solution paths for Etpt+i+1 (i  0). For we are free to choose any value
of pt we like; the model does not restrict our choice. Another way of looking at (3.5) is to
say that we can choose any future value for Etpt+i+1 we wish and work back from that to a
solution for pt. Any view of this future will then compel a present which is consistent with
it; any set of expectations is therefore self-justifying i.e., anything can happen provided it
is expected, but what is expected is arbitrary. Worse still, as (3.5) illustrates, these paths
for events can be unstable; in fact, our model here implies that all paths for prices except
that for which pt = m, explode monotonically. Thus the model would assert that only by
accident would an equilibrium price level be established, otherwise prices would be propelled
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into either ever-accelerating hyperination or ever-deepening hyperdeation, even though
money supply is held rigid!
To prevent these unstable paths, we appeal to an optimising government, choosing the
ination tax. Having chosen its optimum target  which here for simplicity we set at
zero  we assume it sets a money supply target designed to achieve it, provided unstable
paths do not occur. It then needs, in order to achieve this optimum, to prevent these
unstable paths from occurring. It turns out that a commitment on its part to put an end to
any ination (deation) bubble paths at some point, by decreasing (increasing) the money
supply su¢ ciently to force prices o¤ this path, will do the trick. For if people expect that
ination will stop at some period t+N (at which the bank will step in), then desired real
money balances in t + N will now be higher and ination would fall at t + N . If ination
falls in t+N then people would postpone consumption at t+N   1 and ination would fall
at t+N   1 too. And so on. By backward induction the whole process gets invalidated. We
can show this formally by imposing the terminal condition
Etpt+i+1   Etpt+i = 0 for i  N .
Substituting the terminal condition in (3.4) yields
Etpt+N+1 =

1 + 


Etpt+N   m

Etpt+N+1 = m.
This implies from (3.5) that, pt = m. It can be seen that a terminal condition
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has the e¤ect in the model of selecting the unique stable path for the price
level. Another way of describing our terminal condition would be as a side
or transversalitycondition: all these express the same idea, that there is an
additional restriction on the model, here coming from government or central
bank behaviour designed to rule out what is from their (or societys) viewpoint
an undesirable outcome, in this instance for the monetary environment.
Dealing with the Non-uniqueness problem
Now let us suppose for some reason  in (3.5) is negative and <  0:5. Now we
have multiplicity of stable paths since
1+

 < 1: there is no unique stable path.
Now all the paths in (3.5) are stable, because we have rigged it so that
1+

 < 1.
This problem was rst pointed out by Taylor (1977). It turns out that a terminal
condition (Etpt+N  Etpt+N+1) does in fact impose a unique stable solution in this
case too (see Minford and Peel, 2002). Our terminal solution implies:
m+ (pt  m)

1 + 

N+1
= m+ (pt  m)

1 + 

N
,
which is strictly valid for nite N only when A = 0. Thus also: Etpt+N+1 =
pt = m. Thus the terminal condition helps us to select a unique stable path
even in this case.The justication for such a condition is that non-uniqueness
must cause quite as serious a problem as bubbles. For the endogenous variables
may in each period jump by unpredictably large (strictly unbounded) amounts;
even though they will subsequently be expected to return to equilibrium. Such
uncertainty would in all likelihood provoke changes in behaviour su¢ cient to
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create an incentive for the government or money issuer to make a commitment
such as is set out in the terminal condition. This commitment would then limit
the uncertainty as we have seen, to that associated with the most stablepath
a result much in the spirit of Taylor (1977) that the minimum variance path
will be selected by collective rationality.
4 The New Keynesian model with terminal condition
An analogous argument can be constructed for the frictionless NK model discussed above.
Suppose that the economy is described by (1.1) and (1.2) plus a demand for money func-
tion given by (3.1) and the identity pt = t + pt 1(money supply being endogenous under
the Taylor rule, money is supplied as demanded in 3.1). Now we add to this model the
terminal condition, Ett+i+1 = Ett+i (for i  N) : This terminal condition is produced by
a supplementary feature in the overall monetary policy framework, which states that if this
terminal condition were not satised under the Taylor rule then policy would switch to a
money supply rule that would force the satisfaction of this condition. It is easy to see that
the model of 3.1 (plus 1.1 for interest rates, now no longer controlled by the Taylor rule) and
such a rule would yield a solution for t +N of Ett+N = (1 + )Ett+N   Ett+N+1: this
monetary equilibrium condition tells us what money supply growth () must be at t+N for
given Ett+N in order to implement the terminal condition, viz Ett+N = Ett+N . In e¤ect
money supply growth must be whatever is needed to force the demand for money and the
supply of money into equality at a constant ination rate from t+N .11
11It must be stressed that this solution for the money supply growth required is simply the mathematical
implication for the money supply growth that would emerge from this policy. In practical terms one would
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Now returning to the model with the Taylor rule but adding this terminal condition, we
nd that substituting it in (1.4) yields Ett+N+1 = ?: Thus, we have t = Ett+1 = ?. We
have ruled out unstable paths by appealing to a terminal condition on ination implemented
via the money supply (or money growth) rule. Is this terminal condition credible? As
we have argued, the government has an incentive to prevent a bubble path because it is
the stable path that maximises its objectives. There is a lot at stake here for it and people
understand this. Therefore a commitment to stop these bubble paths is credible. This implies
that money cannot be avoided in NK models, contrary to the cashless worldinvoked by
Woodford et al.12
It can be seen that this government commitment acts to disrupt unstable paths in just the
same way that Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (1983) suggestion for government fractional backing of
the currency prevents hyperination paths (while a transversality condition on real balances
not tending to innity because they would be swapped for consumption goods rules out
hyperdeation). Our suggestion can be thus thought of as a practical way of implementing
the same idea.
The terminal condition also solves the non-uniqueness problem that arises
imagine that were a bubble situation of ination disorder to break out the central bank would have to
deploy open market operations that convinced market participants of the impossibility of any alternative
ination path being permitted. For example these could include a severe contraction of money designed to
give a downward shock to rising inationary expectations. The point is that the central bank does whatever
is needed to enforce its commitment against bubble paths. Success in forcing ination to be constant would
then imply the money supply growth shown. Of course such success in turn implies that we will only ever
observe money supply growth of, .
12We o¤er a similar argument incidentally as a possible interpretation of the European Central Banks
second pillar. The second pillar could be regarded as a commitment device designed to anchor ination
expectations in the face of explosive paths for credit and broad money. Thus the ECB uses the Taylor
Rule as a practical short term device but always stands ready to override this Rule should the behaviour
of the banking sector threaten to produce unsatisfactory longterm ination behaviour. Neumann (2006), in
a review of monetary targeting by the Bundesbank, stresses the desire to inuence public expectations of
ination as a central motivation for the strategy and a key element in its success.
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when the Taylor principle is violated in this model,  < 1, and rules out all
stable paths except the original saddlepath. This is the case if the terminal
condition is selected in nite time as it is with a terminal condition. What
this suggests is that one could have had a Taylor rule pre-1980 that did not
satisfy the Taylor principle and yet produced determinate ination in line with
the ination target. If so why was ination so high in the 1970s? If one agrees
that a terminal condition is indispensable in the context of this model then the
only plausible explanation for changes in ination dynamics is time-variation in
ination targets.13 In sum, we agree with Cochrane (2007a, b) that the central
empirical argument for the NK Taylor rule view of ination determination that
ination got out of control in the 1970s because the Fed reacted insu¢ ciently to
ination is inadequate.
Finally, we would also note that the NK model behaves in its usual way with a
Taylor rule since we never observe the unstable paths or the non-uniqueness problem
under which the Taylor rule is not binding; the terminal conditions mere existence
therefore stops bubbles or non-uniqueness, so that the policy switch is never
observed, only the Taylor rule. Thus in a very practical way we have here the ordinary
NK model; all we have done is to support the validity of its operation by a terminal condition
implemented by a monetary policy switch that never in practice needs to be used because its
mere existence makes its use unnecessary; we have also rendered the Taylor Principle
inoperative, its role being taken over by the terminal condition. This latter is the
13We would note that this is implicitly what Ireland (2007) is saying. His NK model has
a Taylor rule that satises the Taylor principle for both the pre- and post-1970 period. The
dynamics of ination in his model is explained by time-variation in ination target.
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Big Stickin the closet whose existence ensures orderly behaviour under the normal Taylor
rule. Thus the terminal condition acts like a special sort of monetary rule in which a variable
(money) is used to implement a target for another variable (prices) by taking whatever value
is necessary. Examples of such rules are xed exchange rates in which reserves (thus money)
are varied as much as necessary to hit an exchange rate target; or xed interest rate rules
in which money is varied as much as necessary to hit an interest rate target. Under the
terminal condition in the NK model, money becomes endogenously set at whatever growth
rate is needed to achieve an exogenous price target path.
5 Conclusion
The New Keynesian model of ination determination has no e¤ective mechanism for ruling
out explosive bubbles or to deal with indeterminacy of stable paths. It fails to provide
a reason for private agents to pick a unique stable path. We propose a way forward. Our
proposal is in e¤ect that the NK model should be formulated with a money demand and
money supply function, as above in the traditionalmodel; as there too, it should embody
a terminal condition on ination. This is implemented by an override on the money supply
rule explicitly designed to stop unstable paths or the non-uniqueness problem at some
point should they occur. To replicate the Taylor Rule we simply specify the money supply
rule to imply the Taylor Rule being followed; thus the Taylor Rule has the interpretation
of an operational money supply rule  as intended by Taylor in his original paper. It
is apparent from our reformulation that nothing changes in the NK model. The escape
clause strategy in which the monetary authority commits to deviating from the
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Taylor rule to a policy of controlling the money supply in the event that bubbles
or indeterminacy of stable paths occurred eliminates this equilibrium in NK
model; its mere existence therefore stops bubbles/non-uniqueness, so that the
policy switch is never observed, only the Taylor rule. Hence the NK model
behaves exactly as usual. Note however that the Taylor Principle is no longer
operative; in e¤ect its role is superseded by the terminal condition.
Thus in summary we reinterpret the nature of monetary policy under Taylor Rules used
in NK models. Monetary policy is in e¤ect not fully revealed by simply writing down a
Taylor Rule; behind itlies various implied commitments  viz to the provision of money
according to a long-term (terminal) condition that limits undesirable behaviour of ination
with an override of the money supply rule implicit in the Taylor Rule. These commitments
enable the NK model with a Taylor rule to operate in the usual way. However it does imply
that money cannot be avoided in the NK set-up, contrary to the cashless worldinvoked by
Woodford (2008).
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